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The Case for Change
Despite years of policy changes, Australia faces formidable challenges to our
future prosperity.
Australia has long been a comparatively wealthy nation within the global
community, providing a good standard of living for its citizens.
When most Australians think about the future, they are rightly concerned that
our nation be able to continue to provide a good living standard for all our
citizens in an age of great technological change and globalisation.
The Taskforce does not accept that these processes — the cause of much
anxiety in Australia — must necessarily erode Australians’ living standards
in the years ahead. The task before us is how we equip our citizens — all our
citizens — to be successful and prosperous. The first step in that process is
a clear-eyed view of the challenges to Australia’s prosperity this century. We
achieve nothing by being needlessly alarmist or excessively complacent.
The good news is that in purely economic terms, Australia remains a wealthy
nation, currently ranked 13th in the world in terms of GDP per capita. (4)
The bad news comes in three parts:
1. We are slipping behind in earning our living in the world.
2. We face a great challenge to boost Australia’s productivity, and hence
living standards, for the future.
3. Without prompt action our success in the world will come at the cost of a
more divided society.
We now deal with these in turn:
1. We are slipping behind in earning our living in the world.
International trade is important to Australia’s living standards. Our
export earnings boost Australian economic growth and help to fund our imports
from the rest of the world. The impact of international trade on the Australian
economy is illustrated by Australia’s terms of trade — the average prices of
our exports, divided by the average prices of our imports. Australia has
suffered a long-term deterioration in our terms of trade over the past four
decades, as shown in Figure 3.
Put simply, this means that Australia’s export earnings cover less and less
of the bill for our imported products, detracting from our total national
income. This can be illustrated by adjusting GDP per capita today for the change
in the terms of trade. If we enjoyed the average terms of trade of 122 in the
1960s, as shown in Figure 3, GDP would be 2.8 per cent higher than it is today,
or around $900 of extra national income for every man, woman and child in
Australia.
What can be done to reverse the decline in Australia’s terms of trade? It
is widely accepted that the reason for the decline is the shift of global trade
towards higher value added goods and services, whereas Australia’s exports
have not undergone a commensurate transformation. Australia must therefore
accelerate development of its share of global trade in emerging growth
industries in ICT, environmental management and biotechnology, as well as across
a range of elaborately transformed manufactures (ETMs), and radically improve
its performance in latent high value-added services trade, such as education and
health care.
The conclusion is that to earn a better living from international trade in
high value added sectors, including those of the new economy, Australia must
become a Knowledge Nation.
FIGURE 3: Average terms of trade by decade (5)
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full size, 7 Kb.
(4) World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000
(5) Note: Index year 1998–99 = 100
2. We face a great challenge to boost Australia’s productivity, and hence
living standards, for the future.
Improving productivity — the amount of national output produced by inputs
(especially labour) into the production process — is crucial to improving
national living standards.
Put simply, increases in productivity are the best sustainable way of
increasing living standards because they produce the extra output that can then
be distributed back to those who made it, rather than relying solely on
redistributing income from elsewhere within the economy.
Australia’s productivity performance in recent years has been impressive.
Table 2 shows labour and multifactor productivity since the 1970s. (6)
TABLE 2: Australian productivity growth rates (annual average)
| |
Labour Productivity |
Multifactor Productivity |
| Second half of 1990s |
3.7 |
2.0 |
| 1990s |
2.9 |
1.4 |
| 1980s |
1.4 |
0.4 |
| 1970s |
2.8 |
1.3 |
| Average since 1964/65 |
2.4 |
1.1 |
Source: ABS 5204.0
In its recent review of Australia’s productivity performance, the
Productivity Commission concluded that this improved performance was the result
of microeconomic and labour market reforms during the 1980s and 1990s. (7)
Interestingly, the Productivity Commission also concludes that this
productivity acceleration has not been due to the take-up of new technologies.
(8)
A key benchmark for productivity is the United States, driven in particular
by the fact that United States living standards (GDP per capita) are more than
50 per cent above Australian levels. (9) In this case, the comparison is less
encouraging. As Table 3 shows, Australia has closed the (labour) productivity
gap with the world’s leading economy more slowly than all but five of the 22
OECD countries listed. (10)
So where is the next big productivity boost to originate that will allow
Australia to bridge the productivity (and hence living standards) gap with the
leading global economies?
The Taskforce argues that while additional economic reforms such as those of
the 1980s and 1990s can and will further improve Australian productivity, the
great productivity gains in the future will flow from investing in human
capital, innovating in industries, and embracing new technologies.
This conclusion is supported by the findings of a recent two-year OECD study
into the drivers of economic growth for the future: (11)
 | In the long term, growth depends on building and maintaining an
environment that is conducive to innovation and the application of new
technologies. This involves ensuring the generation of new knowledge, making
public investment in innovation more effective, improving interaction
between universities, research institutes and firms, and establishing the
right incentives for innovation. (12) |
And
 | Investing in human capital is good for growth, especially in the context
of rapid technological change: for ICT to be used effectively and the
benefits of new technology to materialise, the right skills and competencies
must be in place. (13) |
The conclusion is that Australia must become a Knowledge Nation to improve
the productivity and, therefore, the living standards of our people.
(6) Labour productivity is simply output per hour worked. Multifactor
productivity measures the efficiency with which both capital and labour inputs
are used in the economy.
(7) Productivity Commission (19 June 1999) The New Economy? A new look at
Australia’s productivity performance.
(8) Note, however, that recent (and heavily qualified) research from the Reserve
Bank of Australia (David Gruen ‘Australia’s Strong Productivity Growth: Will
it be Sustained? ’ Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, February 2001) does
suggest the use of IT was a significant factor in Australia’s productivity
growth during the 1990s.
(9) In $US at Purchasing Power Parity (1998). Source: United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Handbook of Statistics Table 6.1
(10) These labour productivity figures were prepared on a Purchasing Power
Parity basis
(11) OECD (2001) The New Economy: Beyond the Hype 1 — Final Report on the OECD
Growth Project OECD. http://www.oecd.org/subject/MCM/2001/products/0001321e.pdf
(12) ibid, p1
(13) ibid, p13
3. Without prompt action our success in the world will come at the cost of a
more divided society.
The Taskforce believes it is morally unacceptable for the benefits of
economic growth to go disproportionately to the few.
History teaches us very clearly what happens if change and reform are not in
the interest of the majority of people. A recent book, Globalisation and
History: the Evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy, disproves the
popular belief that the globalisation of the early part of the 20th century was
brought undone by the First World War. It was brought undone by a popular
backlash against globalisation before the First World War. (14)
The same point was well made by The Economist, which stated in a recent
editorial:
 | International economic integration is not an ineluctable process ... it is
only one, the best, of many possible futures for the world economy ... [G]overnments,
and through them their electorates, will have a far bigger say in deciding
this future than most people appear to think. The protestors are right that
governments and companies — if only they can be moved by the force of
argument, or just by force — have it within their power to slow and even
reverse the economic trends of the past 20 years. (15) |
In this context, a report by the National Centre for Social and Economic
Modelling makes sobering reading. (16)
TABLE 3: Productivity levels in OECD countries, 1950– 98 (GDP per man-hour
relative to the United States)
| |
1950 |
1960 |
1973 |
1987 |
1992 |
1998 |
| United States |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
| Japan |
15 |
20 |
45 |
60 |
67 |
68 |
| West Germany |
34 |
52 |
73 |
91 |
100 |
106 |
| Germany |
|
|
|
— |
87 |
90 |
| France |
42 |
51 |
74 |
99 |
101 |
102 |
| Italy |
38 |
46 |
78 |
96 |
97 |
100 |
| United Kingdom |
58 |
57 |
68 |
81 |
79 |
82 |
| Canada |
68 |
72 |
75 |
83 |
82 |
80 |
| Australia |
66 |
68 |
69 |
77 |
75 |
78 |
| Belgium |
50 |
53 |
76 |
102 |
108 |
109 |
| Denmark |
54 |
58 |
79 |
85 |
85 |
89 |
| Finland |
32 |
37 |
59 |
69 |
74 |
82 |
| Greece |
19 |
n.a. |
43 |
55 |
54 |
54 |
| Ireland |
32 |
n.a. |
46 |
66 |
77 |
86 |
| Korea |
11 |
n.a. |
15 |
25 |
32 |
36 |
| Mexico |
35 |
n.a. |
47 |
n.a. |
41 |
34 |
| Netherlands |
49 |
57 |
82 |
98 |
107 |
98 |
| Norway |
51 |
n.a. |
71 |
96 |
104 |
109 |
| Portugal |
20 |
n.a. |
42 |
44 |
48 |
50 |
| Spain |
24 |
n.a. |
53 |
79 |
80 |
79 |
| Sweden |
50 |
55 |
78 |
84 |
82 |
84 |
| Switzerland |
70 |
74 |
84 |
85 |
87 |
85 |
| Coeff. of variation1 |
50 |
n.a. |
30 |
26 |
25 |
24 |
1 Excluding Mexico and Germany.
Source: OECD estimates.
(14) KH O’Rourke and JG Richardson (1999), Globalization and History: The
Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy. MIT Press
(15) The Case for Globalisation, The Economist, 21 September 2000
(16) A King (May 1999), Trends in the Distribution of Australian Incomes,
National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling
Analysing income distribution trends between 1982 and 1993–4, the report
concludes that:
 | Falls in real earnings are shown for those in the lower part of the income
distribution; substantial increases are shown for those in the upper parts
... This spreading of market incomes can be seen as the result of
developments such as Australia’s changing economic structure,
globalisation, and changes in industrial relations. |
Over the period 1982 to 1993, Australia shared this phenomenon of increasing
inequality of market incomes with most other developed nations. However, the
report goes on to note:
 | What might come as a surprise is ... that, despite a marked increase in
the inequality of market incomes, there has been relatively little change in
the overall distribution of total after-tax income. The main reason for this
is that developments in social security — real increases in many payments,
substantial increases in family payments and rent assistance — have
largely countered the increasing inequality of market incomes. (17) |
In this, Australia stood out against an international trend. This is a
laudable achievement, but the concern must be that a government without a
similar commitment to social justice will allow these underlying inequalities to
emerge.
The Taskforce believes that the job for government in the century ahead will
be to attack the root causes of inequality in market incomes as well.
There has been much argument that globalisation has led to a decline in
low-skill wages (in developed nations) relative to high-skill workers. There is
little empirical evidence for this in Australia. However, a recent study by the
Economic Planning and Advisory Council (EPAC) indicated the significant returns
to high-skilled workers, in the form of higher employment growth, as indicated
by Table 4. (18)
This supports what most Australians understand intuitively — that higher
skills are the road to more secure employment in the modern Australian economy.
The conclusion is that Australia must become a Knowledge Nation, investing in
the education and training of all its citizens, to give each a secure and
prosperous place in the modern Australian economy.
Taken together, these three elements of improving our international trade
performance; boosting our national productivity; and bridging the skill,
employment and income gaps in our society, illustrate briefly the Taskforce’s
case for a radical change towards making Australia a Knowledge Nation.
The next task is to describe how Australia is performing in creating a
Knowledge Nation compared to other countries.
TABLE 4: Wages and employment growth by occupational group (%)
By skill level of occupation |
Nominal Wages
(1986–1995) |
Employment
(1986–1994) |
| High |
58 |
24 |
| Middle |
52 |
0 |
| Low |
55 |
2 |
Source: EPAC (1996)
(17) ‘The Case for Globalisation’, The Economist, 21 September 2000
(18) Economic Planning and Advisory Commission (EPAC) (1996) Future Labour
Market Issues for Australia; EPAC Paper #12; AGPS
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